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This paper sugge8/s an impron:mcnt to the scheme
by Bayer and Met=ger for the cncipherment of ETrees. Search "'eys are "disguised" instead of encrypted, and together with the data pointers and
tree pointers which remain encrypted, prevents the
opponent or attacker from recreating the correct
shape of the B- Tree. Combinatorial block designs
are used as a method to substitute the search keys
contained within the nooes of the B- Tree. The
substitution provides advantages in terms of the
number of decryptions necessary to traverse the BTree, while the use of block designs are advantageous in terms of the small amount of information
that needs to be kept secret. The method is aimed
at enhancing the use of encryption for the nodes
of the B- Tree, and not as a replacement of the encryption algorithm. Although in this paper it is
used in the context of B- Trees, the method may be
applicable to other record storage organizations.
Keywords: Data encryption, Security, Database
systems.
eR Categories: E.3, II. 2.0, H.3

In recent years there has been a considerable interest in the area of database security, and computer
security in general. One ofthe security mechanism
that can be used to secure the records stored inside
-a database system is based on cryptographic techniques, more specifically on the use of encryption
to prevent illegal users from reading the contents
of the database [1,2.3,4[.
In many database encryption schemes that have
been proposed the encryption module is not a part
of the database management system, Instead. the
module is located outside the database system.
such as in a trusted front-end or a trusted "filter" system, In general, this placement of the
encryption module results in the reduced flexibility on the part of the database management
system. Records are encrypted and passed-on to
the database management functions which places
them according to their cryptogram values, not according to their original plaintext value. This results in the "'scrambling" of the shape of the data
structure that is used for the organization of the
records. The inflexibility becomes obvious when
range searches and partial-match queries are performed over encrypted records, The only search
that can be performed without having to decrypt
every record in the database is that of exactmatching between encrypted query elements and
the cryptogram records. Using exact-matching as
the only possible method for database searches,
the operations of the database system becomes
very limited.
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Introduction

ConrerelH:~

One possible solution' was suggested by Bayer
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Pi (1 SiS m) which is used to derive an encrypting key for that page. More specifically, two
encryption functions were proposed, namely T for
text encryption and P K for page key encryption.
Each page number Pi has a corresponding page id
which is ~d.
For any page Pi having page id P;d, the contents
of that page is encrypted using T with the page
key Kp; which is calculated as follows:

·td Metzger in [5] in the context of B-Trees [6].
hatt'ad of having the encryption module external
to the database system and the data encryption
pt-r(ormed at "high-level" in the sequence of the
wdling of the records, the encryption module
.!:'ould be placed inside of the database managemrnt system and data encryption performed at
:!.t< ~Iow level" close to the disk-write stage of the
H· Tree node blocks and data blocks. The placem.. nt of records in data blocks and the shape of
tt.(' I1-Tree would then be the same as the case
.la'n encryption was not performed. The B-Tree
that organizes the records has no knowledge of the
rncryption software or hardware. Before a node
Llock or data block is written to the physical disk
!:(JIO the main memory, it is encrypted first. The
I,rocess of decryption is applied to any node block
I)f data block which is read from disk into main
mrmory. This provides security in that the blocks
\l .....d to store the records are completely encrypted
olud the opponent or attacker cannot distinguish
":1(' block from the next. Bayer and Metzger [5]
'\lucst the use of hardware encryption module
to perform this "on-the-fly" encryption and derryption. Note that in many commercial database
i'",chges access to the low-level database functions
., not provided. The library of functions for the
.:.\tabase customization usually limits the access
lo thc database mechanisms that manages records.
rhus, the scheme presented by Bayer and Metzger,
ol.nd the improvements presented in this paper, are
"tlly applicable in the case where low level access
In the database management system components
u possible. Database systems which are developed
'"in· house" or commercial database systems that
provide the source code access would be a suitable
r.a.ndidate for this scheme. In the following section we will briefly discuss the B-Tree encipherrrlf'nt scheme presented by Bayer and Metzger.

Background:
of B-Trees

where KE is the file key or tree key. Then the page
contents Mp; of page Pi is encrypted using T with
Kp; as follows:

and decrypted as:
M~• = Tii P
i'
' (ef,)

Two kinds of encryption systems were proposed
for B-Trees, namely block ciphers and progressive
(stream) ciphers. In this paper we only consider
the use of block ciphers, which is more applicable
to fields of records or whole records .

3

Encryption of Node Blocks

In section 2 the units of storage used with respect
to the encryption functions were pages within a
given file. In the following sections we will adhere to the notation found in [7], in which the
term block will be used to indicate the unit of secondary storage which holds a defined set of records
ofthe database. The nodes of the B· Tree which do
not hold any records a.re referred to as node blocks
while those that do contain the actual records are
referred to as data blocks. In the case where the
records are stored in the node blocks the two terms
are used interchangeably. Each node block will
consist of the triplets [search key, data pointer, tree
pointer]. The tree pointers of a node point to its
children nodes, the search key is used to navigate
through the nodes and the data pointer associated
with a search key points to the block in secondary
storage which contains the record with that search

Encipherment

In [5] nayer and Metzger proposed a page key
.du~me for paged file structures (such as B-Trees),
'" hereby each page in a file F has a page number
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key. To aid the discussion, the i-th triplet out of
the n triplets in a node block b will be denoted as
(k~,aLp~) or (k,a,p)~.

(k~,at,p~) is as follows:

From section 2 we see that one of the disadvantages of the scheme in [5] is that the contents of
a given node of the B-Tree depends on some iden·
tifier (Pid) associated with that node. This dependency on the identifier ensures that each node
has a unique encryption key, and that the encryption of two identical data items within two different nodes will result in two different cryptograms,
making the attacks by an opponent harder. From
the point of view of the insert and delete Oper·
ations this dependency may result in too much
overhead in the case of the D-Tree rcconfiguration.
Regardless of whether each node actually holds the
data or holds a pointer to the data, when the can·
tents of two child nodes are merged into one parent node each triplet (kt,at,pt) in the two child
nodes must be decrypted, merged into the parent
node and then re-encrypted. If the parent node occupies a new storage block. then a new identifier
must be generated and a new encrypting key must
be calculated. Out of the three elements of the
triplet, the tree pointer p~ almost always changes
when the triplet moves to a new node block. The
search key
hardly ever changes, while the data
pointer a~ only changes when the actual records
are moved from one data block to another. Hence
the scheme can be improved by removing the need
to decrypt and re-encrypt static search keys within
the triplets.

where E is the encryption function, f is the disguising function, b is the block number and the
symbol "II" denotes concatenation. A node block
with n triplets would have n + 1 search keys kt I
n tree pointers pt and n data pointers a~ [7]. The
one tree pointer which does not have an accompanying tree pointer and data pointer should simply
be disguised through the function f.
Having this configuration reduces the number of
triplets that needs to be decrypted in a node block
during a search. The function f can be a one way
function, or even an encryption function. However. one of the motivations for not encrypting kt
is to reduce the number of necessary decryptions
~nd reduce the amount of space required for storage of the cryptograms. The process of disguising
the search. keys and the encryption of the data and
tree pointers should take place at the "low level",
internal within the database management system
after the shape of the B- Tree has been determined.
In the following section we will describe a possible
method of disguising the search key using combinatorial block designs.

1M), E(b II a~ II p~)

kf

4

Disguising Search Keys

In this section we discuss a possible method for disguising the search key k~ instead of encrypting it.
It is important to realize that disguising the search
key offers less security than encryption. However,
the encryption of the tree pointer p~ and the data
pointer a~ should prevent the opponent from reconstructing the B-Tree. Disguising the search key
will make the effort to compromise the tree more
difficult since the opponent cannot make an association between the disguised search key and the
other two elements of the triplet. In this section
the term block in block design should not be CODfused with block in node blocks. The first refers
to constructs in combinatorial mathematics, while
the later refers to database storage units. In discussing combinatorial block designs we will use the
notations and definitions found in [8].

One result of keeping all the triplets (kr,a~,pn
encrypted together is the need to decrypt more
than one triplet within a. given node block. In [5]
Bayer and Metzger suggested a binary search·anddecrypt method to find the suitable tree pointer
to follow. In the worst case this may take log2n
decryptions. where n is the number of triplets in a
node block. An improvement to this scheme is to
keep the search key k~ in node block b as plaintext.
and disguise it in some way. Even if the search key
is compromised, the fact that the tree pointer pt
and data pointer
are encrypted prevents the
opponent from reconstructing the B-Tree. Hence
a suitable format for the encryption of the triplet

at
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First, consider a difference set with parameters

tical terms, an instance of the mapping of linc.
to ovals can be achieved by simply multiplying
the set of "integers" that represent the points 1'1:
(x = O, ... ,k-l) on lines Ly (y = O, ... ,v-l)
by a suitable value t modulo v, resulting in the
set of "integers" that represent the ovals Oy (y =
0, ... , v -1). A very small example of such a multiplication modulo v, mapping lines to ovals, is
given below. Here we have a (13,4,1) block design. With t = 7 the points {Po, ... , P3} on lines
{L o, ... ,L 12 } are mapped to ovals {Go, ... ,O12}:

{v, k, >.}. Such a difference set is also recognized as
{v,b,r,k,>.} balanced incomplete block design,
with b = v and r = k. Here v is the number of
objects or treatments·in a finite set S, and a block
design which is based on the set S consists of a collection of k-sets from S, having the property that
(~ach object appears in r of the k-sets. The numher r is also referred to as the replication number.
In order to be useful for the encryption of node
hlocks, we must have that v ::> R, where R is the
!lumber of records in the database. This is to en"ure that the process of disguising the search keys
cannot be easily inverted by an opponent. Note
that here the symbol k (as in k-sets) has no relalion to that in the search key

II.
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A useful way to illustrate the possible use of
block designs for disguising search keys is to consider the blocks as lines in the finite projective
plane of order n with v = n 2 +n+l, k = n+l and
,\ = 1. In this instance the blocks {Bo, .. . , Bv-tl
ran be treated as lines {Lo, ... ,Lv~l}' The incidence matrix for this block design consists of v
tOWS of 1's and D's, with a 1 in row x and column y
of the incident matrix indicating that the point Pz
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In this example there are 13 lines whereby 4 points
occur on every line. The rows of the left·hand
block design consists of the points occurring on the
lines, whereas the right-hand block design shows
the same points on ovals.

(x; O, ... ,k-l) lie, on line L. (y; O, ... ,v-l).
To disguise the search key of a given triplet, we
can employ a two-step "scrambling" of the set
of integers that make up the search keys in the
IJ· Tree. The first step consists of the mapping
from the search keys to the "integers" that represents points Pz (x = O, ... ,k - 1) on lines Ly
(y = O, ... ,v -1). This step can take the form
of a natural mapping between the search keys and
the treatments in the block designs. Of more inlerest is the second step, in which the points Pz
(:t = 0, ...• k - 1) are mapped to other combinatorial "structures", hiding the original block design.
III order to be useful for disguising the triplets, the
two step mapping must be invertible to allow the
recovery of the original block design and hence the
original integer search keys in the triplets.

4.1

Substitution using ovals

One way of using block designs to disguise search
keys is simply to renumber the search keys hascd
on the result of mapping lines to ovals. The first of
the two-step "scrambling" of the search keys can
be ignored, and the actual search keys are used in
the second step of the scrambling.
The substitution of the search keys is as follows. First, the treatments that make up points
{Po, ... ,Pk-d on lines {La, ... ,Lv-d are used as
the actual search keys, and they are "disguised" or
replaced using the treatments that make up the
same points on oval {Oo, ... ,Ov_l}. In effect, the
search key
is multiplied by t modulo v, resulting in a new integer used as the substitute for the
search key. In doing so, the apparent shape of the

One possibility for the 'second step is to map
the points Px (x = 0, .. . ,k -1) on lines LlI (y =
0 •... ,v-I) to points on ovals 011 (y = 0, ... , v-I).
In this case an oval is defined to be a set of k
points no three of which are collinear [9]. In prac-

kS
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the search key 1 is substituted by 7, 2 by 1,3 by
8, 4 by 2 and so on.
In this scheme, the only information that has to
be kept secret are the parameters {v, k, A} of the
block design, the first line Lo and the mapping
from the lines to ovals. This presents a considerable advantage in terms of space used to hold
cryptographic information. Conversion tables to
maintain the correspondence between the actual
and the disguised search keys are not required. In
fact. the parameters of the block design and first
block Po can be stored in "tamper-proof" devices,
such as smartcards, which are carried by the legal
users of the database system.
Note that we do not place triplets in node blocks
,based on the value of the disguised search key. The
position of the triplets throughout the tree is the
same as when the search keys are not disguised.
This implies that the substitution of the search
key kt by k~ is done after the correct tree pointer
p~ and data pointer a~ have been obtained and
the triplet is ready to be written onto the physical
disk. This ensures that range searches that require
access to a whole subtree within the B- Tree can
still be performed.

B-Tree as viewed by the opponent will not follow
the expected shape of a normal B-Tree. Having
access only to the B- Tree representation on a Sequential set of disk blocks, the opponent will face
difficulty in determining the most likely children
node blocks of a given parent block. An example
of a small B-Tree before and after the search key
substitution based on the above set of points is
given in Figure 1.

__ 11 9 [8411',
~ ... ~".
"
3
10
Il7!'l!';jSIB 1 l1li '0 ;;'ll'""ll111-,,~.6~1~=m
@] Search Key k b DNull Tree Pointer
~

j

E1

Tree Pointer

pf

E1

I

Data Pointer

aT

Encrypted elements

Figure 1: Example of the search key substitution
using treatments on ovals

4.2

The substitution of a given search key is performed starting with line La. The k points on the
line are compared with the search key. If none
of the points on the line matches the search key,
the next line Ll is generated. The comparison is
repeated again between the search key with the
k points on the line. This process of comparison
is repeated until a successful match is achieved,
hence the requirement that v >- H, where H is
the number of records in the database. If one of
the points on a line matches the search key, then
an oval is generated corresponding to that line.
The search key kf, which matches the point on
the line, is substituted by the equivalent point on
the oval. In this instance, a "match" between the
search key and a point means that their integer
representations are equal. To prevent confusion,
we will denote the "new" search key as kf. Thus,
with respect to the previous block design and oval,

Although the encryption of the search keys provides the best security, it is disadvantageous in
terms of the resulting cryptograms that ha'-e to
be substituted for the search keys. Depending on
the space available and other computer resources,
the encryption of the search keys may be suitable.
However, this will result in triplets that consume
large storage spaces on the node blocks. Fewer
triplets can be fitted onto a given node block, and
the depth of the B-Tree would then increase substantially.
An alternative to the encryption of the search
keys is to use the treatments in a block design as
the exponents of a given integer modulo the number of objects v in the design. Another way of
looking at this is to consider the treatments as exponents of a primitive element 9 E ZN, where N is
prime. Here N should :gever be less than v. Sub-
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Substitution using exponentiation
modulus

stitution is performed as follows. First, a suitable
treatment tuP of point Pp on line Lu must be found
such that gta~ mod N equals the search key kS to
he substituted. Once such a treatment is found,
the corresponding treatment on oval Ou can also
be found. The substitution is not done using the
treatment on oval DOt. The treatment on the oval
is instead used as the exponent of 9 modulo N,
the resulting integer of which is used for the substitution. Here the value of 9 and N must be kept
secret, in addition to the secret block design. A
small example using the previous (13, 4, 1) block
design with 9 == 7 and N = 13 is given below,
where each exponentiation is reduced modulo N
(Figure 2):

~

mil
b

_- ~J3 ~lIpm!
-,
'
-

~119

~

"-

I'll 1141116g IIIO •

9j i
fiL

S

This method of substitution can be made
stronger by choosing N to be greater than v, and
the only requirement is that 9 be a primitive element in ZN. The largcr the value of N, the
more security is achieved. As mentioned previously, the only limit to N is the amount of space
available on a node block. Similar to substitution
using treatments on ovals, this substitution must
be performed at a low-level, just before the actual
disk-write stage of the node block.

4.3

IIl

':~'

Figure 2: Example of the search key substitution
using exponentiation modulus
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sum of

Instead of being associated with a given treatment in a block, the search keys can be associated with whole blocks in the design. First, a
continuous subset of R blocks must be selected
from the set of all blocks in a {v,k,).} block design. Similar to the block designs used in the
previous sections, the blocks can be considered
as a set of points {Po •... , Pk-l} lying on lines
{LQ, ... ,Lv_d. Then each search key can be assigned one line, either starting at Lo or at Lw
for some integer w > O. If Lw is used as the
starting line, then the number of lines v must
be large enough to allow a continuous subset
{Lw,._.,Lw+R} (w + R < v -1) to be selected
from the set of v lines_ Thus, for R records in the
database we must have v > R. The "integers"
that form the treatments in a given line, which is
associated to one search key, can be used as the
input to another disguising function, the output of
which is used as the substitute for the search key.

0 Search Key kt DNull Tree Pointer
GTree Pointer pf El Data Pointer at
I Encrypted elements
7'
7'
7'
7'
7'
7'
7'
7'
78
7'
710
7"
7"

Substitution using the
treatments in blocks

78 7"
7' 7'
7' 712
7' 7'
710 7'
7' 7'
7" 7'
7' 78
712 7'
7' 7'
7' 7'
7' 7"
7' 7'

Given that there is a set of integers associated
to a given search key, there are various possibilities in using the integers to diguise the search key.
One possible method is to simply use the sum of
the "integer" treatments of each line as the substitute for the search key associated with that line.
More specifically, given that the starting line is Lw,
where w > 0 and·w + R < v-I, and given that
the search key kt is associated with a given line
Lx (w $ x $ w R) then kt can be substituted

+
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by~. where
~

k~ ~

k-1

z= z= t~p

a=UI {3=O

and tap is the "integer" treatment forming point
P{3 on line LO/. Here the summation is done with·
out reducing modulo v. In simple terms, for a
given line L~ (w ::; x ~ w + R). besides taking
the sum of the integer treatments on the line L~,
all the other integer treatments starting at line Lw
until line L3:_1 is also added to the sum of treat·
ments of line Lx. Using the (13, 4,1) block design
above, we have the following values for kf:

-- ---

,

"

1~lrrn~IIII~I.~. i1mltl"'".-~. ""';;1""'1
;'"

ill Search Key k
[j

kb

0 1 3 9
1 2 4 10
2 3 5 11
3 4 6 12
4 5
7 0
5 6 8 1
6 7 9 2
7 8 10 3
8 9 11 4
9 10 12 5
10 11 0 6
11 12 1 7
12 0 2 8

rt1 ::mJ~
<;~
...... rill
~~Et O'\~

•

Tree Pointer

b

j

pf

D Null Tree Pointer
§]

Data Pointer

at

II Encrypted elements

Figure 3: Example of the search key substitution
using the sum of the treatments

13
30
51
76
92
112
136
164
196
232
259
290
312

that ascending order. Hence, whether substitution of the actual search keys is done a.t a "high
level" before records are passed·on by the filter to
the database management system. or at a "lower
level" within the database management system
components near to the disk·write stage, the shape
of the B· Tree is still maintained. In the high level
security filter. each record may have a plaintext
search field which is included in the checksum cal·
culation for that record. Instead of placing the
actual plaintext search key in that field, a substitution can be performed before the security filter calculates the checksum. The database management
system then creates its B- Tree based on the values
in the plaintext substituted search key. Since the
substitution using the sum of treatments preserves
the ordering of the original search keys, the shape
of the B· Tree would be the same as in the case
when no substitution was performed. The summation of the treatments in the blocks or lines is
by no means the only way to disguise search keys.
With a. sl'arch key being associated to a line, and
thus to a set of "integer" treatments, many other
substitution methods can be devised based on the
treatments.

with Figure 3 showing the resulting B· Tree with
the substituted search keys.
The summation method given in the example
above does not have strong security when R is
small. The subset of blocks ranging from w to
w + R is chosen to prevent the opponent from
discovering the first block Bo in the design. One
advantage of the summation of the treatments is
that is can be used for the substitution of search
keys in high.level Security Filters {2,lOJ or front·
ends retrofitted onto commercial "off· the-shelf"
database management systems, which usually pro·
vide no access to low·level record routines except
through a library of customization functions. For
a given set of unique search keys kt in an as·
cending order of size, the corresponding substi·
tute search keys kt derived through the summa·
tion of treatments is a set of integers maintaining
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5

Encryption of Tree Pointers, Data Pointers and Data
Blocks

There are a. number

of ways in

p:~.a~,p~) can be encrypted.

which the triplet

However, as men-

lioned earlier, increase in flexibility is obtained
..... Ilen the search key
is not encrypted The tree
pointers p~ and data pointers a~ remain encrypted
I\~ in [5] together with the node block number.
Currently, two of the most commonly used
nyptosystems are the Data Encrypted Stan(i:ud (DES) [11} and the llivest-Shamir-Adleman
(USA) [12] cryptosystem. The DES can be used to
('lIcrypt data segments or blocks of 64 bits, while
the RSA cryptosystem can encrypt any data segments of length less than its modulus N. In this
paper we consider the use of the RSA crypt08Y8(em (or exponentiation modulus) for the eneryplioll of the tree and data pointers. This choice is
motivated by the fact that this cry~tosystem is beroming increasingly available on hardware implementations, which may be suitable for low levels
accesses to the disk blocks in the database systcm. In addition, the properties and weaknesses
of the RSA cryptosystem are widely known and
milch research have gone into understanding the
rryptosystem.
The RSA cryptosystem is known also as a
"public-key" or "asymmetric" cryptosystem, and
a number of possible attacks have been suggested
and are discussed in [13]. These attacks are usually
performed using the publicly known information,
such as the modulus N and the public encryption (or decryption) key. Note, however, that the
l'trength of the RSA cryptosystem is "increased"
when it is used not in the usual public-oriented
manner. More specifically, when the RSA cryptosystem is used to encrypt a message and none of
the encryption parameters are made public, then
the attacks by opponents are made considerably
harder. The opponent may not even start to solve
the factorization and discrete logarithm problems,
since there is no public information available ex("cpt for the cryptograms. A multilevel organization of encryption keys based on the RSA cryptosystem is presented in [14]. This multilevel

kt

scheme can be applied to the encryption of till'
tree and data pointers in the B-Tree, and aho
the data blocks. It may also allow each triplet
in a node block to be assigned a security level, reo
stricting access to data by users of lower security
clearances.
The encryption algorithm used for the encryption of data blocks can be different and independent to that used for the tree and data pointers
in the node blocks. Having a different encryption
algorithm or a different set of encryption parameters may provide better security. The compromise of node blocks will only provide the location
of data blocks, and such a compromise may not
necessarily aid the opponent in breaking the data
, blocks. Note, however, that the compromise of the
B· Tree node blocks can lead to the compromise of
the search key substitution parameters. The illegal reconstruction of the whole B- Tree may inevitably show the substituted search keys in the
B-Tree, and the opponent can proceed to deduce
the possible values of the original search keys.

6

Remarks and Conclusion

In this paper we have suggested a method to substitute search keys in the context of the encipherment node blocks in a B-Trees. This method is
based on the use of combinatorial block designs.
The main aim of the search keys substitution is
to allow faster traversal of the D· Tree by reducing the number of decryptions required in a given
node blocks. Search keys are substituted instead of
encrypted, and in determining the path to follow
down the tree, comparisons of substituted search
keys is faster than decryptions. Given that an opponent or attacker is trying to reconstruct the encrypted B-Tree, the substituted search keys will
not provide the correct shape of the original BTree. This is also due to the fact that the tree and
data pointers are encrypted. Another advantage is
in terms of storage space. Substituted search keys
require less space than an encrypted search key.
Combinatorial block designs have been employed
as a method for substituting search keys. From
the security point of view the main advantage of
the method lies in the small amount of informa-
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tiOI!- that needs to be stored, namely the block design parameters and the first block of the design.
The method is aimed at enhancing the encryption
algorithm employed for the encipherment of the
B- Trees, and not as a. replacement the encryption
algorithm. The encryption algorithm that is used
to encrypt the tree and data pointers must be a
secure one. The encryption algorithm and parameters used for the encryption of node blocks can be
different to that used for data blocks. The method
of disguising search keys proposed in this paper is
by no means restricted to B- Trees, and it may be
applicable to other record maintenance schemes
used in database management systems.
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